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THE GHOST OF MALTHU S 
Steve Emmert 
April! 1979 
The bearing and rearing of children are the 
beautiful destiny toward which a woman's whole 
body and personality point from earliest child-
hood on. If this profound goal cannot be achieved, 
the result is far too often a shriveling of the ' 
personality of the individual. 
Dr. Marie Robinson, 1959 
In Ethiopia, famine in Welo and Tigre provinces 
left nearly 100,000 dead last year; some people 
were so weakened that when a rainstorm struck 
Dese, the capital of Welo, they drowned in a 
couple of inches of water, unable to raise their 
heads from the gutter. 
~. 1974 
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HISTORICAL lO:PULATION GROWTH 
No discussion of population can begin and end with 
the examination of historical data, perhaps combined with 
some extrapolation of past trends into the future. Equal-
ly suspect would be any treatise which ignored these issues. 
In few disciplines will one find historical trends as stri-
king as that of population growth. 
The first estimate of world population was made quite 
by accident when both the Roman and Chinese empires held 
censuses in the first century A.D. (1) The figure was 
somewhere "between 200 million and 300 million. In 1650 
A.D., it was about 550 million. During the intervening 
16-~ centuries, the average rate of increase was little 
more than one twentieth of 1% per year." (2) (Herein is 
introduced the important concept of compound growth rates. 
At a growth rate of one twentieth of 1%, a population would 
double in roughly fourteen centuries.) Since 1650, the 
world's population has risen dramatically. At about 1850, 
the figure was one billion, and it had reached two billion 
by 1930. (3) Lester Brown, of the Overseas Development 
Council, comments: 
It took 2 million years for man's numbers to 
reach 1 billion, but the second billion came 
in only 100 years, and succesive billions are 
coming even faster. At the present rate of 
increase, the sixth billion will require less 
than a decade. (4) 
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The recent acceleration in birth rates has commanded re-
spect from the media, which have devoted widespread atten-
tion to the subject. Or1ly in the past few decad~s have 
gloomy population forecasts.become commonplace. The first 
mention of the problem, however, came f~om an English 
parson who soon found himself scorned and attacked from 
all sides by his peers in the early 191£ century. This 
lonely man, whose ghost must surely now be smiling, is 
the reverend Thomas Robert Malthus. 
II 
FARSON MALTHUS (5) 
Thomas Robert Malthus was born in 1766 in England. 
His father, Daniel Malthus, was, in the year of Robert's 
birth, the first Englishman to receive the exiled Rousseau, 
who was on his way to Scotland to join David Hume. The 
younger Malthus was born after the great European popu-
lation increase had begun, and lived to see the beginnings 
of the Industrial Revolution, which gave him his first look 
at human misery. He was educated at Jesus College in· 
Cambridge, and was awarded a degree with first class honors 
in mathematics in 1786. The young Malthus saw two great 
revolutions, the American and the French, the latter having 
a profound influence on his thinking. 
In 1798, Malthus published his first Essay on the 
lrinciple of Population, (6) prefacing it with the remark, 
"The following owes its·origin to a conversation with a 
friend." (The friend i.s generally conceded to be Malthus' 
father.) The immediate reactions in the intellectual com-
munity were of controversy and respect for Malthus, (7) 
although skepticism was the general rule. The poet Coler-
idge was said to have remarked: 
I solemnly declare that I do not believe that 
all the heresies and sects and factions, which 
the ignorance and wickedness of man have ever 
given birth to, were altog:ether so disgraceful 
to man as a Christian, as a philosopher, a states-
man or citizen, as this abominable tenet. 
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The ]!ssay was not published by Nal thus as a moneymaking 
effort, since he was a man of relatively wealthy background. 
It was essentially an intellectual exercise. 
Malthus followed this first essay with a second, this 
one signed, in 18P3. In 1805, he married his cousin, Har-
riet Eckersall. Subsequent editions of. the~ essays were 
published into the 1820's. ~1althus. died of heart failure 
in 1834 at the age of 68, and was buried in Bath Abbey. 
Aside from his famous population theories, Malthus 
contributed to the foundation of rent theory, arguing close-
ly along the lines established by Ricardo. (8) Malthus 
formed the basis for the law of diminishing returns, and 
inspired Darwin's thinking, which led to the theories of 
evolution. Despite the variety of his interests, however, 
Malthus is interpreted by sensationalists only in terms of 
the logical result of his work, which was his attack on the 
poor laws on the grounds that they artificially maintained 
a high population. (9) 
III 
THE FOFULATION FROBLEN 
Growth 
As discussed in chapter I, man's population has been 
increasing at an alarming rate. Lester Brown comments, 
"The current world population growth rate of nearly 2% 
annually - which brings a doubling every 35 years - is 
unprecedented." (10) The forces affecting population growth 
are many, but professor Thomas Dow of the State University 
of New York writes, " ••• if no change in current fertil-
ity is assumed, world population will increase from 
approximately 4 billion in 1975 to 34 billion in the year 
2070." (11) As noted here, fertility represents the num-
ber of children borne by the average woman of childbearing 
age. Thus, the level of "replacement.fertility," or the 
point whereupon each man and woman is replaced by one child, 
would be about 2.1 children (in developed countries) per 
woman, allowing for infant mortality. In contrast, "the 
fertility ratio- in much of the third world exceeds 5 .o 
children per woman." (12) The-.:result is that "population 
growth~.in the, less developed countries runs two to two and 
a half times greater than the affluent countries;" (13) 
Table 1 shows the distribution of world population along 
with growth rates for each region. 
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Table 1 
World Population in the Past 30 Years, 
(in millions) · · 
1970-1976 
Region 122Q 1960 1970 1976 annual growth 
2501 298b )610 4044 World 1.9% 
Africa 219 273 352 412 2.7% 
North America 166 199 226 239 0.9% 
Latin America 164 216 283 333 2.8% 
East Asia 675 788 926 1021 1.6% 
South Asia 693 856 1101 1283 2.696 
Europe 392 425 459 476 0.6% 
Oceania 13 16 19 22 2.0% 
USSR 180 214 243 258 1.0% 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1 1977, p. 8. 
The scope of the problem is conceded in Great Decisions: 
Thus, while world population is doubling every 
35 years,·the population of some of the less 
develo~ed countries is doubling in 18 years or 
less. ( 14) 
Causes of Growth 
Primary among the causes of population growth is 
religious predisposition. In addition to the well-known 
Catholic doctrine, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism are ex-
pressly pronatalist. Indeed, with respect to Islam, 
Richard Fagley writes, "In regard to parenthood, the ethos 
of Islam might be generally described as procreation un-
limited." (15) In the absence of radical theological 
changes, religious pressures will continue to provide a 
motive for persons worldwide to have large families. 
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In underdeveloped countries, a high level of infant 
mortality may serve to boost family sizes. The infant 
death rate in these countries averages 33%, (16) a fact 
that at least contributes to population growth. Lester 
Brown argues that "often a woman must bear six or more 
children in order to be certain that one will survive 
to adulthood." (17) It is easy to see, however, that 
technology is subject to much faster change than is cul-
ture, and rural mothers are now finding themselves with all 
six children surviving childhood. The result is that 
"the high infant mortality rate prevailing in the LDC's 
adds to the pressure for more children." (18) 
In much the same way, social pressures may tend to 
increase family size. Large families are simply the custom 
in many societies, and in some, a man's prestige is depen-
dent upon his virility, which is in turn measured by the 
number of his children. (19) Everett Hagen notes: 
Some observers judge that a dominant motive de-
termining the number of children wanted may pe 
the importance placed in traditional rural life, 
on perpetuation of the family through the male 
line •. • • • Since any given child is approx-
imately as likely to be a girl as a boy, this 
desire leads to families with a total number of 
children not far from twice the number of boys 
needed to insure that one will -grow through 
adulthood and parenthood. (20) 
In other words, having children is important, but having 
boys is more important. Frofessor Hagen adds that cer-
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tain "irrational" ·factors may raise family sizes- factors 
such as manliness and relief of lonliness on the part of 
the woman • ( 21 ) 
The Economics of the Family 
Importantly, the economic ·structure of the underde-
veloped countries may perpetuate;the desire for larger 
families. Ey definition, these countries are not indus-
trialized, with primary employment opportunities in agri-
culture. Great Decisions explains the pressures on the 
individual farmers: 
The Asian peasant, tha African nomad, with no 
farm machinery, little or no fertilizer, and 
usually a water shortage' ·needs all the cheap 
labor he can get"to wrest his hard living from 
the earth. Children provide cheap labor - and 
insurance for his old age. (22) 
Economically, large families may be riveted into the struc-
ture of these nations, as farmers are simply making reason-
able choices: 
In peasant agriculture, the labor of growing 
children is useful, and investment in them 
yields higher· returns than alternative uses 
of funds. (23) 
While this concept is somewhat questionable from a macro-
' ,.· 
~~anomie viewpoint~ it is actually a simple contrast be-
tween private and social rates of return. While this 
policy (Large families) is clearly not in the interest 
of the societies, it is really the only viable option for 
the individual farmer. In this case, what is good for the 
9. 
part is demonstrably bad for the whole. In order to take 
advantage of the only way of life known to,them, peasant 
farmers are behaving perfectly rationally as consumers. 
In their industry, labor is far eaeier (and perhaps cheaper 
in the short run) for them to incorporate into their trfirms." 
Changes in the Death Rate 
Clearly the determining factor in the sudden increase 
in population growth is the decrease in the death rate. 
All of the other factors, which served to stimulate the 
birth rate, were no doubt formulated in an attempt to 
counteract a high death rate. The fall in the death rate 
has not been offset by cultural changes to limit the birth·. 
rate, with predictable results. Folitical analyst George 
Eckstein writes: 
The recent and rapid introduction of modern 
medical technology and public health facilities 
into pre-industrial societies, rather than in-
creased .fertility, seems to have caused larger 
numbers of people to survive into the childbear-
ing age. ( 24) · 
The effects o.f this injection of lifesaving technology 
into underdeveloped countries has been dramatic: "In 
s9me extreme cases, like Ceylon, the death rate fell to 
one-third its previous level in a matter of thirty-odd 
years." (25) The gravity of this condition cannot be 
appreciated without some knowledge of the stages of demo-
graphic transition. 
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The Demographic Transition 
The demographic transition is the process by which, 
through social development, a nation experiences a'fall 
in death rates followed by a fall in birth rates. ·Figure 
1 depicts these changes over a period of time. 
Figure 1 
The Demographic Transition 
I 
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Stage I of the transition is a period of high death rates 
being compensated for by higher birth rates. The intro-
duction of medical tachnology carries a nation into stage 
II, which is characterized by a precipitous drop in the 
death rate. However, as Hagen points out, "declines in 
birth rates begin long after those in death rates." (27) 
With the availability of this technology, virtually every 
nation in the world has passed stage I, with the greater 
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part of Africa, Latin America, and Southern Asia now in 
stage II. Stage III, where both birth rates and death 
rates have reached low levels, describes most of the de-
veloped world, including Europe, the USSR, and North 
America. Stage IV, where birth rates fall below death 
rates, represents a mature state of population stability 
or shrinkage. In recent years, some Western ~uropean 
nations, such as East and West Germany, Switzerland, and 
Austria, have reached this level of demographic evolution. 
Implications for Food Production 
Nalthus began his essay by stating two postulates, 
the first of which conceded the essentiality of food as 
regards man's survival. Agriculture professor Vernon 
Sorensen argues that "at the current 2% annual increase 
rate, some 70 million newindividuals must be fed each 
year." (28) Father Arthur McCormack, a delegate to the 
UN Population Commission, put the problem into agricul-
tural terms : 
World food production must be doubled in the 
period between 1965 and 2000 to stay even; it 
must be tripled if nutrition is to be brought 




United States I'ublic Law 480 provides for the distri-
bution of u.s. agricultural surpluses among foreign countries. 
This procedure fills both humanitarian and domestic economic 
goals by increasing available grain for LDC's and preventing 
domestic surpluses which would depress food prices. · 
That foreign countries have depended upon the u.s. for 
food is clear. Lester Brown tells the story (30) of an Indian 
official who was urged to build grain reserves to mitigate 
disasters. He replied "Why should we bother? Our reserves 
are the wheat fields of Kansas." UN F'ood and Agriculture 
Organization Secretary-General Addeke H. Boerma conceded: 
••• in the past two years, things have sharply 
worsened. Food production in the developing coun-
tries has fallen way behind population growth • 
• • • the world has allowed itself to drift into a 
dangerous degree of dependence on the prowess 
exercised on the plains of North America. (31) 
It is also foreseeable that "it is essentially the poorer 
less developed countries that will become ever more dependent 
on u.s. food exports."(32) 
Effects of dependence 
The effects of the steady stream of American grain into 
developing countries are marked. Rather than concentrating 
on development projects and agricultural reform, these nations 
have taken the shipments for granted and ignored farm development. 
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The prevailing thought of economists is that: 
• •. u.s. aid - more than 240 million tons of grain 
in the last 20 years - has postponed a more perma-
nent solution by masking the symptoms of scarcity 
and lulling the poorer nations. into complacency. (33) 
Martin Davidson elaborates: 
• • .food aid has actually helped delay land re-
forms in South America and the Indian Subcontinent, 
and kept a wealthy elite in power that doesn't 
care for agriculture. · 
To the extent that such nations have been able to rely upon 
American shipments to feed their hungry millions, no serious 
changes in agrarian policy are likely.' 
Not only have U.S. food shipments deterred indigenous 
production, but as Senator Proxmire explains, 
Food for Peace (PL 480) has been converted in part 
to military purposes. As much as $150 million a 
year of funds generated from the sale of American 
surplus farm commodities abroad has been spent for 
military purposes.(35) 
Distribution on both ends has tended toward this philosophy. 
The food earmarked "for peace" has more often acted to fuel 
war. In 1973, almost all of the PL 480 shipments went to the 
crumbling governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam. In 
turn, the recipients usually sold the grain to finance the 
war. (36) 
Status of food aid 
Contrary to the expectations of foreign governments, the 
aid upon which they depend is hardly stable. Daniel Balz 
remarks, "· •• if there were a quick way to characterize 
the national policy on food aid, it is that in times of surplus, 
14 
the country is generous, and in times of tight supply, the 
u.s. is stingy." (37) Efforts to end this dependence by gradual 
cutbacks have been attempted, but the results have been charac-
terized as "deep political exasperation and only questionable 
results in terms of reform."(38) Considering Mr. Balz' 
statement, the developing world may fairly consider itself 
fortunate that the U.S. has enjoyed four consecutive bumper 
crops. Times have not always been so good. Frances N. Lappe 
wrote in 1975 that "food aid has plummeted. Barely one-sixth 
as much food as ten years ago is now being shipped abroad from 
the U.s •• ·" (39) .. , Stephen Rosenfield noted as early as 1974 
that "the Food for Peace program must be considered all but 
defunct." (40) The cutbacks were drastic from the supplying 
end, but the crunch was felt by the receivers'; 
Despite the fact that more persons are in need of 
food than ever before, in the past year alone, 20 
million people have been cut off from Food.for 
Peace programs. (41) 
Logistics of food aid 
The system of food aid is fraught with difficulties from 
beginning to end. The~ York Times warned in September, 1975: 
• • .inspection agencies are owned by grain com-
panies whose products they inspect •••• Close re-
lationships develop both between the agencies and 
the companies they inspect and between individual 
inspectors and grain company personnel. (42) 
Ten weeks later, a page-one article blared: 
••• shipping agents, representing foreign embassies 
and some shipping brokers, systematically rig~ed 
quotations of charges for shipping grain. (43) 
Grain that reaches developing countries may or may not 
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get to hungry people. Frimary among the problems is diffi-
culty in storage. George Borgstrom contends that in India, 
rats often eat more grain than is brought into the country 
in a given month. He adds, describing,the rats,-"their 
number is indicated as being in the billions." ,(44) James 
Watson notes that "in some countries, as,mu9h as ,80% of a 
food crop may be lost due to the depredations of moulds, 
insects, and rodents." ( 45) 
Another Herculean task is faced: in the distribution of 
what food the rats leave behind. f'opulations in developing 
countries, being widely dispersed, are the more difficult to 
reach due to the lack of passable roads. Alan Berg writes of 
the magnitude of the problem in India alone: 
To conduct a comprehensive program in rural India, 
it would require reaching 65 million farm families 
in 567,000 isolated villages •••• In the last 
ten years, the largest of the undertakings has 
reached fewer people than the population growth 
during the same period. (46) · 
All due emphasis should be given to the prevailing conditions 
in these countries so that the problem will not appear to be 
one limited to dispersion of people. ~ reports that "In 
Ethiopia some of the neediest areas are so deep in the 
countryside that only caravans of donkeys and camels have been 
able to reach them." (47) In short, suitable transportation 
is not available. Thus, the absence of road, rail and canal 
combines with a population widely strewn about the nation to 
hinder distribution efforts. The World Food Conference conceeds: 
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• • • the experience of feeding programs accum"'ulated 
during the last 20 to 30 years tends to indicate 
that, in general, the coverage achieved so far is 
too limited, in many instances not more than 2% 
of the target grouv. (48) 
One further complication is presented by blackmarketing. 
Diversion of grain, especially emergency grain, is common-
place. Two examples are noted by~ and u.s. News and World 
Report: 
In Bangladesh, where thousands of people starved 
last year, some officials estimate that hundreds 
of thousands of tons of emergency rice shipments 
were smuggled into India to be sold for profit. (49) 
Inefficiency and corruption of local bureaucrats 
have slowed the distribution of emergency supplies. 
In Mali and Niger, officials have diverted some of 
the donated grain to commercial channels for sale 
at enormous profits. (50) 
From an economic standpoint, of course, blackmarketing is more 
"efficient" than free distribution, since it generates internal 
transfers of funds, but it must be pointed out that it is 
emergency shipments that are being diverted. 
In any event, the Overseas Development Council clearly 
summarized the problem when they pointed out that 
Food aid cannot solve the LDC's food problem, the 
dimensions of which are too great for imports ever 
to be more than a marginal ai.d. If mis-handled, 
it can, however, discourage indigenous ~reduction, 
by depressing prices on local markets. (51) 
This raises an important point. In addition to the disincen-
tive to production facing recipient governments, farmers in 
the LDC's are hurt by food aid (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2 






Note that F1 , 
F2 because of 
therefore make 
Q3 t the amount 
the price before food.aid, is much higher 
the increase in supply. The local farmer 
a choice among two evils: does he sell 
he would normally sell at the lower 
price, or try to sell more, thus increasing his losses? 
(Incidentally, this analysis does not end with the farmer's 
sunk cost, but includes such variable costs as storage and 
transportation.) This factor combines with the governmental 
disincentive to provide little or no stimulus to indigenous 
production in developing countries. 
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DEVELOPl\1ENTAL AID 
The only viable alternative (in the long run) to food aid is 
developmental aid. This type of assistance seeks to improve 
production in underdeveloped countries by means of capital 
grants; in short we are "teaching them to fish" rather than 
"giving them a fish." Developmental aid is one of the most 
promising means of solving many of these countries' problems. 
It is not, however, without its share of difficulties. 
Unemployment 
To say that unemployment in the LDC's is a problem is to under-
state the problem almost criminally. Population Reports 
laments that 
Already plagued with widespread unemployment and 
underemployment, India is now beleaguered by 100,000 
new entrants into the labor force each week. 
According to economist Harry T. Oshima, at least 
15% of the labor force is jobless in Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Halaysia, and the Fhil1ppines. One-third 
of Bangladesh's available manpower may be unem-
ployed. Indonesia's working-age population is 
increasing by an estimated 1.8 million annually; 
one-fourth of the nation's ~otential labor force 
may now be out of work. (52) 
That was the good news. The bad news is that it's going to get 
worse (see table 2). 
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Table 2 
Population of Children Under Age 15, with :Percentage of Total 
(in millions) 
Region Number of Children % of Total 







Europe 112 24% 
66 26% USSR 
Asia 883 38% 
Oceania 7 32% 
Source: J?opulation Bulletin, January 1979, p. 18. 
It is easy to spot the trouble zones. Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia, in which children make up 42%, 44% and 38% of total 
population, respectively, will see a massive influx of laborers 
in the next 15 years. (53) As early as 1980, according to 
one projection, (54) the LDC' s may face a collective unem-
ployment rate of 30%. 
Rather than creating new job opportunities, development 
is likely to exacerbate unemployment. The resulting snow-
ball effect may be difficult to remedy: 
A shift to. [capital _7 intensive agriculture is 
fraught wit serious consequences for the growing 
labor force ••• This inevitably leads to a re-
duction of labor requirements, without much possi-
bility of absorption of the displaced by other 
sectors. (55) 
There is no further room for employment in agri-
culture, because of the heavy rural overpopulation 
that already exists. On the other hand, the ability 
of the industrial sector to employ more workers is 
seriously limited by the nature of the technology 
employed. (56) 
Thus, the agrarian overpopulation would pile 
up still further, concentrated on the poorest, 
smallest farms which a~e already oversaturated 
with surplus labor. (57) · 
Technological unemployment resulting from the 
mechanization of agriculture is.unlikely to re-
main in rural areas. Ultimately, it will move 
to the cities and further increase the amount 
of underemployment in petty services. (58) 
Finally, we come full circle: 
••• unemployment in the developing countries 
••• by depriving so many millions of people 
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of purchasing power, is the most pervasive cause 
of hunger. (59) 
lncome Polarization 
The money generated by development aid has in the 
past served to widen the income disparity in developing 
nations. Martin Davidson notes that "foreign assistance 
has benefitted elite groups. It has contributed little 
to the welfare of poor people in poor countries." (60) 
Lester Brown argues that "the entire rural income gener-
ated by agricultural subsidies and outlays has gone to 
a small number.of big landlords." (61) In this sense, 
very little benefit comes to peasant farmers who have 
invested labor in the process. This factor contributes 
to the alraedy staggering disincentive discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Inflation 
Whether cash or capital, development assistance car-
ries the threat of inflation. John Laffin explains one 
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facet of' this phenomenon: 
Because their own resources are limited, too much 
money can cause aid-inflation, which is too much 
money chasing too few goods. (62) 
This developmental demand-pull can serve to cripple de-
velopment efforts if it raises prices faster than incomes. 
On the other hand, Lester Brown points out that cost-push 
inflation is not unforeseeable: 
••• the capital investments for laying the 
foundations for intensive agriculture are tre-
mendous • • •• a sum of' about $32 billion must 
be invested in the production of modern agricul-
tural means of production. This calculation, 
incidentally, more or less omits the capital 
needed for mechanization • • • • ( 63) 
The Green Revolution 
The "green revolution" is a special type of devel-
opment aid which utilizes certain high-yield grains depen-
! •• 
dent on fertilizers. It was intended to enable the LDC's 
to dramatically increase their food production without the 
great time lag concomitant to normal economic development. 
Edward Goldsmith characterizes one major problem faced 
by those who took advantage of the green revolution: 
Unfortunately, these "miracle grains" are highly 
vulnerable to disease, and therefore require 
increased pesticide protection, and, of course, 
they demand massive inputs of fertilizers (up 
to 27 times present ones). (64) 
The importance of these additions became readily·apparent 
in 1973 when the price of oil· (and therefore petroleum-
based fertilizers) was quadrupled. Time comments: 
-
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The Green Revolution, which only a few years 
ago brought hope of agricultural self-sufficiency 
to India and other Asian countries, has already 
lost much of its promise. The increase in oil 
prices has nearly tripled the cost of nitrogen 
fertilizers and of fuel for irrigation pumps 
upon which the crops of high-yield rice and 
wheat rely. (65) 
. . 
In addition to their high costs, the grains presented 
other difficulties. Pests tecarne more than just another 
problem; they threatened the entire program. "In the 
Philippines, the miracle rice attracted ''miracle" rats, 
a tough and larger breed, which decimated the fields." (66) 
Biologists became concerned with the loss of genetic var-
iability presented by the program, which converted entire 
countries to a single crop. Edward Groth noted in 
Environment: 
When vast acreages are planted with a single 
variety of crop, the appearance of a new or 
mutant and resistant strain of a pest or crop 
disease organism can pose a threat not only to just a few farmers, but to a nation • s entire 
crop. (67) ·· . 
Environmentalists are on the opposite side of the ecolog-
ical fence from those sponsoring the revolution. Great 
Decisions comments that these environmentalists are push-
ing for a limit on phosphate fertilizer use and irrigation 
reservoir construction, adding, "Many experts argue that 
every victory for the environmentalists means a loss in 
global food potential." (68) As noted above, the grains 
are highly vulnerable to disease, necessitating the use 
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of some pesticide. In developing countries, the cheapest 
and most available pesticide is DDT. The precarious eco-
logical balance is underscored by John McHale, as he writes, 
"Minute amounts of DDT have been found to reduce photo-
synthesis in marine plants by as much as 75%. 11 (69) These 
plants are important not only for their oxygen-producing 
role, but also for their status. as the first link of the 
food chain that ends with man. (70) At the very least, 
this presents a potentially insoluble problem for man in 
the long run. 
For all its promise, the green revolution has proven 
a big disappointment. Keith Griffin of Harvard concludes 
that "despite the green revolution, the level of existence 
of the masses has yet to improve significantly." (71) 
Illiteracy 
Yet another barrier to increased agricultural output 
in the LDC's is illiteracy. Ernest Snyder writes: 
Increased production of food calls for education 
of farmers in modern agricultural practices. 
But th:e LDC's suffer from widespread illiteracy 
(75%,in ,India) and education begins with reading. 
(As one observer said, "Why ship dehydrated soy 
milk foods to the starving masses when they can-
not read the instructions on th:e packages'?") ( 72) 
The importance of literacy in agricultural development 
-
is difficult to overstate, but no more difficult.than the 
task confronting anyone about to remedy the situation. 
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The Barrier of Religion 
In many societies, religion may restrict the poten-
tial of those societies to industrialize, ·In India, for 
example, the socio-religious caste system has prevented 
social interaction between classes, while Japan, without 
such restrictions, has developed well ·past India despite 
a paucity of natural resources. Sociologist Max Weber 
alluded to this cultural barrier in his book The :Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (73) This stumbling 
block must be removed if the developing countries are to 
achieveany perceptible economic growth. 
VI 
LAND 
The only real alternative to mechanization and capi-
tal-intensive agriculture for nations wishing to increase 
food production is increased land use. This type of pro-
gram would avoid the unemployment problem by emphasizing 
labor-intensive production. 
Land Status 
In many areas of the ,world, trends already point 
toward increased land utilization. However, it appears 
that I < 
• • • all the good land in the world is now being 
farmed, and according to. the FAO, at present· 
rates of expansion, none of the marginal land 
that is left will be unfarmed by 1985. (74) 
. . 
But by 1975, according to Thomas Dow, "most of the econ-
omically feasible opportunities for bringing new land 
under the plow have already been exhausted •• ·" (75) 
It is apparent that farmers initially chose the best farm-
land to work. Not only is the remaining land of poorer 
quality, but, as~ reports, 
To bring marginal farmland into use around the 
world would require a massive investment beyond 
the means of the underdeveloped nations and prob-
ably beyond the generosity ~r administrative 
cooperation of the developed nations. ( 76) 
Soil Depletion 
In centuries past, soil fertility was guaranteed 
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by farmers' practice of allowing an alternate field to 
lay fallow for a season in order to collect nutrients. 
The soaring demand for food has necessitated the almost 
complete abandonment.of this practice. The results are 
summarized by Edward Groth: 
The rate of depletion of soil nutrients has not 
been measured, but can be roughly estimated. 
Some 8 to 9 million tons of nitrogen are removed 
from the soil each year in harvested crops. In 
contrast, about 7 million tons of nitrogen as 
inorganic fertilizer are added to the soils at 
current annual rates; however, no more than 50 
to 60% of that added nitrogen is incorporated 
into crops • • • Some 4 to 5 million tons of 
nitrogen may, there.fore, be drawn from the avail-
able natural pool in soil each year. (77) 
Edward Goldsmith adds that "some of the land now under 
cultivation has been so exhausted that it will have to 
be returned to permanent pasture." (78) Implicit in this 
statement is that not only will total productivity fall, 
but marginal productivity, as discussed above, offers 
little hope of remedy. 
Erosion 
Lest the reader be deluded into thinking that at least 
the supply of land is constant, the subject of erosion 
must be raised. Lester Brown concludes that 
Other parts of the world, including the Indian 
Subcontinent, the Middle East, _North and Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, 
and the Andean countries, are losing disturbingly 
large acreages of cropland each year because of 
severe erosion. (79) 
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The problem would almost certainly be greatly exacerbated 
if the marginal land were brought into production. (80) 
Deforestation has contributed heavily to erosion 
problems in South America and Africa, (81) examples which 
will ssrve to deter massive deforestation efforts elsewhere. 
More importantly, world desert area more than doubled in 
the years between 1882 and 1952, (82) and the Sahara is 
reported to be sweeping southward, in some places as fast 
as twenty miles a year. (83) 
In all, increased land usage does not appear to be 
a panacea. Some well-conceived, carefully supervised pro-
gram of land use is, however, essential to any effort to 
expand food production. 
VII 
BIRTH CONTROL 
All of the problems discussed in the previous three 
chapters have regarded population as more or less stable 
at current levels. This is wishful thinking, of course, 
since the population growth rate is about as high now as 
it has ever been. ·This realization underscores the import-
ance of population control programs, especially birth 
control, in long-term development policy in third world 
nations. 
Jhe Necessity of Birth Control 
Some type of population control program is essential 
to the success of any policy program along the lines dis-
cussed here. Holly MacNamee writes that "without popula-
tion control, all other programs are mere palliatives, 
giving temporary relief in a race to catastrophe." (84) 
Daniel Balz concedes that "unless there is some check to 
population growth • • • there is no solution to the food 
program." (85) This is readily verified by Malthus• own 
position that food supply increases arithmetically (i.e. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ••• ) while population increases geo-
metrically (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ••• ) • While food 
production capacity has often increased at more than an 
arithmetic rate, it seems still true that, in l'>'!al thus' 
words, "the power of population is indefinitely greater 
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than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for 
man." (86) The problem is further compounded by a fact 
that has already been noted - the age structure of the 
less developed countries. The State Department points 
out that "In developing countries • • • the proportion 
of dependent children usually runs between 40% and 45% 
of the total population •• •" (87) Not only have these 
people not hit the labor market, they also have yet to 
begin to reproduce. It is frightening to note that this 
description fits India at the present time. 
The Necessity of Concerted Birth Control 
Without acceptance of the policy by those involved, 
any birth control program is doomed to failure. Lawrence 
Summers concurs: 
It seems clear that family, planning does not work 
where the motivation to limit childbearing is not 
strong. Mere availability of birth control is 
worthless.· With:Out strong desire, £the forces 
of 7 superstition, carelessness, and apathy com-
biiie to ensure that th.e number of children is 
unaltered. 
It seems safe to assume that "controlling fertility is 
not ultimately a question of the effectiveness of the 
techniques but of the acceptance by the public of the 
policies recommended." (89) Professor Dow concludes that 
"fertility will not declin.e to any appreciable degree 
without major changes in the social setting • • • "· ( 90) 
These changes may have to overcome some formidable 
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barriers. The United Nations is on record as viewing 
"the right to procreate as one of the most fundamental." (91) 
Moreover, many governmental policies are expressly pro-
natalist (92) or anti-birth control. The New York Times 
reported in two separate articles in August of 1974 that 
"sixty developing countries are ••• indifferent or op-
posed to the idea of reducing population growth," (93) 
and that 
,, 
The Communist block, along with a number of the 
poorer nations, 'counters that overpopulation 
is an effect, not a cause, of underdevelopment 
and that additional population is needed in many 
areas for development. (94) 
This opposition to birth control is hardly inexplic-
able. Richard Schroeder points out that 
In developing countries, there can be a nation-
alist resentment toward foreign advocacy of pop-
ulation planning - particularly if it comes from 
developed countries. A viable national population 
policy can only stem from the legitimate decis-
ion of a government to deal with its own pop-
ulation, situation, and to devise solutions to 
problems on the basis of its perception of 
national needs. (95) 
Equally important as a barrier to birth control is 
religion, the best example of which is Catholicism. lope 
Paul VI, in the first encyclical, Humanae Vitae, spelled 
out Catholic doctrine which is affirmed to this day: 
• • • we must once again declare that the direct 
interruption of the generative process already 
begun, and above all, directly willed and pro-
cured abortion, even if for therapeutic r~asons, 
are to be absolutely excluded as licit means of 
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regulating birth. 
Equally excluded • • • is direct steril-
ization, whether perpetual or temporary, whether 
of the man or of the woman. Similarly excluded 
is every action which, either in anticipation of 
the conjugal act or in its accomplishment, or in 
the development of its natural consequences, pro-
poses, whether as an end or as a means, to render 
procreation impossible. (96) 
The result of this and other similar policies was charac-
terized by The New York Times in 1974: 
In Southern Asia - India - religious beliefs 
are in large measure responsible for lack of 
interest in and support for contraceptive pro-
grams, with teeming millions the result. (97) 
The necessity of concerted birth control efforts is affirmed 
most eloquently by the fact that the most widely used form 
of birth control in the world is abortion. (98) Lawrence 
Summers states: 
40,000,000 illegal abortions annually provide 
ample testimony to th.e need for better family 
planning programs. (99) 
VIII 
FAMINE 
Mal thus argued that in the absence of "preventive" 
checks to population, such as moral restraint, delayed 
marriages, and celibacy, population would eventually be 
reduced by "positive" checks, such as war, vice, pl~gue, 
and what he called the Ultimate Check: Famine. (100) 
Past Famines 
To discuss the famines of the past in totality would 
be a monumental task. Cornelius Walford devoted an entire 
volume to the study of famines,, in1878. In the most recent 
great famine, in the Sahel (sub-Saharan Africa) and in parts 
of Asia and Latin America, hundreds of thousands perished 
while millions went hungry, The literature reported it 
as follows: 
The Haitian government believes that nearly 
300,000 of its citizens now face possible star-
vation or malnutrition. (101) 
India's monsoon dropped below normal, cutting 
the cereal crop and eroding hopes for near-
term self-sufficiency in cereal production. ( 102) 
Thousands of Hondurans face storvation in the 
next four to five months ••• (103) 
Across Africa's broad chest, from Senegal to 
Ethiopia, the worst drought of the century con-
tinues to cut a 4000 mile swath of devastation. 
After six weeks of light rainfall, nearly one-
third of the 51 million people who live in this 
band from the Atlantic to the Red Sea are threat-
ened by starvation. (104) 
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Present Famine 
No major famine exists now, but this dramatically 
understates the problem. Ehrlich and Ehrlich report that 
some "10-20 million people are starving to death annually 
now. 11 (105) This astounding figure translates into 41,000 
deaths by starvation daily,. which, if concentrated, would 
wipe out a city the size of Richmond in less than a week. 
In fact, in the time it takes to read this paragraph (about 
twenty seconds), ten people have succumbed to starvation 
around the world. 
These facts underscore the problem of food today. 
Public attention is usually not centered on, famine unless 
some major pocket of starvation breaks out. Those 41,000 
people starving daily are condemned to eternal obscurity. 
Future Famine 
Even in the absence of the Malthusian dilemma of 
population growing past all possible subsistence, there 
seems little doubt that future famines will occur. The 
International Federation for Advanced Study is quoted as 
saying that "the most optimistic experts would assign 
near certainty to major crop failures within a decade." (106) 
The tenuous balance maintained by the present international 
order is emphasized by R. G. Anderson: 
In any year from now forward, India and Bangla-
desh could lose as many as 100 million people to 
famine. ( 107) 
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In addition to the massive loss of life which char-
acterizes all famines, widespread social problems are 
certain to occur. One writer observed: 
If the population growth rate of a country con-
tinues to be high for an extended period, the 
descendants of the present population will be 
doomed to unbelievably miserable conditions of 
existence. The demand for ·food will· outrun all 
available indigenous supplies of land and water, 
creating severe and chronic scarcity. (108) 
Holly MacNamee elaborates: 
These views of the bulging population are linked 
with a number of major social problems, among 
which are social instability and disruption, na-
tional division, loss of faith in th.e, nation's 
ideas and institutions, growing inequalities of 
wealth and income distribution among individuals 
arid nations, thestress of crowded complex liv-
ing, technology- augmented powers of citizen · 
surveillance and other threats to privacy, in-
creased vulnerability to terrorism and sabotage, 
enhanced powers of social and evolutionary con-
trol, and world threat of mass destruction through 
nuclear and biological weapons. (109) 
Important in this list of problems is the social upheaval 
question - will food shortages lead to revolutionary actions 
and acts of war? Senator Humphrey wrote in 1974 that 
"Starvation and hunger are the breeding grounds for polit-
ical instability and economic chaos." (110) The Yale Law 
Journal reports that 
Severe food shortages might stimulate acts of pol-
itical or military coercion aimed at securing 
adequate food supplies. (111) 
Interestingly, there is some disagreement on this point. 
Frofessor Jean Mayer argues that, 
Contrary to popular belief, famines (and, for 
that matter, prolonged 'severe malnutrition) are 
rarely accompanied by revolution. The gravely 
underfed are usually too feeble and too preoc-
cupied with problems of immediate survival to 
summon up the orgaDization required to initiate 
and follow through with a revolution. (112) 
Th_e Ghost of TVIal thus 
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Barring massive famine, war, or other means of wide-
spread destruction of human life, the world's population 
seems destined to continued growth. At some point, as we 
have seen, the population must outstrip the capacity of the 
earth to produce food. 
One of the sources of criticism of Nalthus is his 
opposition to the European poor laws. (113) He was derided 
as inhumane and unfeeling for his lack of sympathy for the 
poor. hYen today, the greater part of mankind would side 
against Malthus, being as it is that "governmental respon-
sibility for the provision of food for those who do not 
have enough ••• is now universally accepted." (114) 
The result of this policy should be exactly as Nalthus 
had forecast. Paul Ehrlich concedes that 
• • • sooner or later, population growth will 
completely outstrip the capacity of the u.s. or 
any other nation to supply food. For every 1000 
saved today, ~erhaps 10,000 would die when the 
crunch came. {115) · 
The immediacy of the problem is shocking. In an amazingly 
short period, the threat of massive food shortages could 
become a reality. The Atlas World Press Review notes (116) 
36 
that "each child saved today will condemn another three 
children to death by hunger by the end of the century." 
The world, then, is faced with a terrible dilemma: 
Feed the starving masses, or abandon them? It seems that 
for all the power of Caesar and Napoleon, it is the ghost 
of Malthus that will bring mankind to its knees. 
IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is extremely difficult to find a satisfactory 
solution to the mammoth problems facing the world in the 
area of population. Any effort at change is bound to en-
counter opposition from those who, for whatever reason, 
seek to perpetuate the present structure. As well, any 
policy change is bound to suffer drawbacks in and of itself. 
It seems clear, though, that these drawbacks are far pref-
erable to the Malthusian nightmare. 
Development 
Despite its intrinsic shortcomings, agricultural and 
economic development of underdeveloped nations seems the 
best method of steering clear of long-term famine. By 
developing, these countries are accelerating their voyage 
through stage II of the demographic transition. Everett 
Hagen cites studies by professor Irma Adelman and T. Faul 
Schultz of the Rand Corporation that correlate economic 
development and a lowering of birth rates. (117) Michael 
Endres points to the western world as evidence of the as-
sociation of development and decreased fertility, (118) 
and states that, 
In the short run, economic development is worth 
pursuing in order to lighten men's burdens. In 
the long run, economic development at least con-
tributes to the success of birth control programs; 




If economic development is the first step in a con-
certed policy to lower birth rates, then birth control 
programs are the most important. Without widespread avail-
ability and acceptance of birth control, Malthus' forecast 
of the depletion of resources by a geometrically expanding 
population seems unavoidable. Development and birth con-
trol are mutually supportive: Economic development can 
help to change anti-birth control attitudes and facilitate 
the distribution of birth control devices, while birth 
control, with the concomitant lowering of population growth, 
allows progress to be made much faster in per capita GNP. 
As well, social services need not be spread so thin. 
These benefits, discouragingly, may not manifest themselves 
for a generation or more, but their immediate implementa-
tion will be for the benefit of·nearly all involved. 
!amine Folicy 
In nature, according to Darwin, natural factors will 
check the population of any species by various means. By 
artificially lowering the death rate, man has artificially 
increased his numbers. It may become necessary, therefore, 
to realize, beyond all humanitarian considerations, that 
the best policy in a major famine may be to ignore it. 
This may sound callous, but in terms of purely mathematical 
concepts, it is the only rational course of action. (120) 
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Presently, both governmental and intergovernmental policy 
is contrary to this position, (121) whi.ch may be a very 
costly piece of humanitarianism in the long run. 
It is extremely optimistic to expect the world's pop-
ulation growth to slow dramatically on its own, or with 
token birth control efforts. The responsibility lies with 
world leaders to develop a coordinated world population 
policy to stave off the ghost of Malthus, whose grim task 
may be accomplished sooner than we realize. 
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